Refining the freeloading and no purchase behavior in pay as you wish pricing

Autor(en)

Udo Wagner, Karl Akbari

Abstrakt

Pay as you wish (PAYW) pricing offers a radical shift from posted pricing schemes. Modeling consumer behavior under PAYW pricing promises insights into conditions under which PAYW is profitable. Firstly, this paper extends an established model that builds on inequity-averse consumers and models their behavior in PAYW as well as the seller’s profits. The paper uses a comprehensive approach to describe consumers with low fairness concerns and points to a new segment of consumers who were not considered in previous PAYW models. They are characterized by a decision not to buy a good under a PAYW pricing policy, even if they can get it for free, and are not strongly averse to advantageous inequity. Secondly, the paper discusses the profitability of PAYW with a suggested price when the seller’s ability to suggest high prices is limited. Thirdly, the paper incorporates the effect of disadvantageous inequity aversion on PAYW with a minimum price. Finally, the paper offers guidelines on how a seller should choose the optimal pricing policy.

Organisation(en)

Externe Organisation(en)

MODUL University Vienna, National Taiwan University of Science and Technology

Journal

Review of Managerial Science

Seiten

1769-1799

Anzahl der Seiten

31

ISSN

1863-6683

DOI

https://doi.org/10.1007/s11846-023-00678-1

Publikationsdatum

06-2024

ÖFOS 2012

502019 Marketing, 502052 Betriebswirtschaftslehre

Schlagwörter

ASJC Scopus Sachgebiete

Allgemeine Unternehmensführung und Buchhaltung

Link zum Portal

https://ucrisportal.univie.ac.at/de/publications/4b017552-1ac7-4c16-a051-da3c506a1879